Folk biology and external definitions by Hampton, J. A.
Hampton, J. A. (1998). Folk biology and external definitions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(4), 
574 - 574.
City Research Online
Original citation: Hampton, J. A. (1998). Folk biology and external definitions. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 21(4), 574 - 574.
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/944/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
ple are perfectly aware of the fact that animals procreate much as
we do, and that they often live in family groups having some anal-
ogy with our own.
The hypothesis that we have an innate disposition to classify ac-
cording to the sort of hierarchy that Atran describes ought to be
taken very seriously indeed. Our ancestral environments were cer-
tainly such that they provided strong selection pressures in favor
of being able to classify animals and plants. But how much detail
has been bred into us, in other words, how much the oxymoronic
notion of a “synthetic a priori” is to be taken seriously, is open to
serious doubt. As a fall-back position we can suggest that the sys-
tem in question is the product of capacities and dispositions that
are widely used and that folk taxonomies are the product of some-
thing that is more of a “general purpose” adaptation. How about
folk anatomies and folk sociologies?
Another point that bothers me is Atran’s emphasis on induction
as the basis of classification. Naive inductionism as a basis for ex-
plaining the goals and methods of scientific classification has long
been discredited, but it seems to be a part of the folk epistemol-
ogy that naive scientists are inclined to apply. Scientists identify
the underlying causes of the order that they make out of nature,
and restructure their classifications accordingly. The reasons for
preferring a classification that is etiological, rather than phenom-
enal or symptomatic, should be obvious to every scientist. In folk,
and pre-Darwinian taxonomy the underlying causes are perhaps
assumed to exist, but the groups are treated for the most part as if
they were natural kinds. Nonetheless, it would seem that however
much folk taxonomies distinguish between sows and boars, they
put them together with piglets, much as they associate men,
women, and children. One might wish to take a harder look at folk
taxonomy, and how it interacts with scientific, with the hypothesis
in mind that we have some sort of “module” for causality.
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Abstract: Atran’s thesis has strong implications for the doctrine of exter-
nalism in concepts (Fodor 1994). Beliefs about biological kinds may in-
volve a degree of deference to scientific categories, but these categories
are not truly scientific. They involve instead a folk view of science itself.
The way people understand and categorize the natural kinds of the
biological world has been the subject of much heated debate in
psychology. There have been those such as Keil (1989), and Atran
himself, who have argued for a specialized conceptual module de-
signed specifically to attend to theoretically relevant information
in the stimulus input to identify categories of living things. Hence
the evidence for very early differentiation of living and nonliving
kinds by infants, and of the later use of deep causal structure
rather than surface similarity in making inductive generalizations.
Equally influential has been the notion of psychological essen-
tialism introduced by Medin and Ortony (1989), which is the hy-
pothesis that people believe folk-biological kinds to have essences
that have a causal role in producing the similar physical pheno-
typic appearance and structure of the organisms of a particular
type. Belief in such essences appears to be much stronger for bi-
ological kinds and inorganic substances than for other natural lan-
guage terms such as artifacts. (The evidence for how tightly peo-
ple may hold such beliefs has recently been challenged, see
Hampton 1995; 1998.)
Both of these psychological approaches lend themselves to an
alliance with the philosophical doctrine of external definitions, ex-
pressed in the recent BBS target article by Millikan [A Common
Structure for Concepts of Individuals, Stuffs, and Real Kinds
21(1) 1998]. The human mind/brain is assumed to have evolved
to be able to “track” externally defined types. Put simply, our cog-
nitive representation of a class has to be specified independently
of what it is that the representation represents. Cognitive science
must first determine the real nature of kinds in the world and then
describe the ways in which people represent those kinds psycho-
logically and how they come to acquire such representations. Defin-
ing the kinds purely in terms of internal conceptual representa-
tions can lead to a multitude of problems (Fodor 1994).
Atran makes the excellent point that neither of these theories
of concepts may take for granted that there is a real world of sci-
entifically respectable categories such as species that can be used
by the theorist to ground our conceptual categories of biological
kinds. First, to provide an account of evolution of different forms
from a common ancestor, it is clearly not possible for a biological
kind to have a fixed essence. Second, folk-biological terms such as
tree, sparrow, or fish often do not correspond to monovalent terms
in any scientific account. Third, different scientific purposes may
require different taxonomic structures. Whatever it is that exter-
nal definitions are intended to offer to a theory of concepts, it is
clear from Atran’s arguments that it is not a grounding in the real
nature of the world – at least not as it is understood by current sci-
ence.
Atran’s comparison of Mayan and American folk biology is in-
teresting, but ultimately frustratingly difficult to interpret. The re-
search described here (sect. 1.2.2.1) is perhaps illustrative of the
difficulties of cross-cultural research in general. To make the in-
ductive task meaningful for the two cultures, it was apparently
necessary to ask the Itzaj about susceptibility to diseases of three
essential parts of animals or plants, whereas the Americans were
asked about the likelihood of a type having a particular disease,
protein, or enzyme labelled by a letter. Materials clearly have to
be made comparably meaningful for the two groups, but there is
a danger of circularity here, if by rendering the materials equally
meaningful one also renders their inductive power the same. In
this research, there were notable differences in responding be-
tween the groups, which Atran tends to ignore in favor of outlin-
ing the similarities.
In Western culture, it appears that there is an important in-
fluence of what we might call “folk science” on the use of folk-
biological terminology. One owes some deference to what one
may believe (or may have been taught) science has to say about
living kinds. Children are taught in school that whales are not fish
(although they are not taught that there is no such category as
fish). At the same time, individuals must defer to the naming prac-
tices of their linguistic community, which will themselves fre-
quently vary from context to context.
It is interesting that, with the ready availability of wild life films
on television, it is no longer necessary for people to accept many
of these categorizations on trust. To see whales caring for their
calves, surfacing for air, and singing to each other is to understand
in a direct way about their important difference from other crea-
tures of the deep. We no longer need to defer to science; we can
base our knowledge on evidence that we ourselves can also un-
derstand. Kalish (1995) asked people to say whether a dispute
about the class (e.g., “elephant”) to which some animal belonged
was one that could always be settled as a matter of fact, or whether
it was a matter of a difference of opinion that could not be re-
solved. He found that more than 25% of the judgments about an-
imals were considered unresolvable by fact. Language use there-
fore has an uneasy relation with science. We may be prepared to
alter our categories when science directs us to knowledge that is
incompatible with our existing usage, but only in cases where that
knowledge is seen as relevant. By and large, language users retain
the right to use terms in ways that are subject to social negotiation
within a much broader society, in which the scientific community
is but one small voice.
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